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 Speculation in Financial Markets: A Survey
Felipe Zurita∗
Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica de Chile
Abstract
This survey covers the microeconomic theory of speculation in ﬁnancial mar-
kets, since the development of the economics of uncertainty. It starts with a
description of Walrasian exchange economies, both in general equilibrium –the
Arrow-Debreu model and its extensions– and in partial equilibrium. Specu-
lation, it is explained, is an incomplete-market phenomenon. It proceeds by
analyzing more general voluntary trade environments, with a focus on whether
or not diﬀerences in information are a valid source for belief heterogeneity. The
role of common priors in the no-trade theorem is discussed. Finally, heteroge-
neous priors models are considered.
∗This is a revised version of part of my doctoral dissertation at UCLA. I would like to thank
Antonio Bernardo, Jack Hirshleifer and David Levine for their support and many suggestions, and
the detailed comments of two anonymous referees. All errors are mine.
11 Introduction
To speculate in asset markets is to trade motivated exclusively by the possibility of
capital gains. Speculation, then, involves a belief, possibly divergent from the rest
of market participants, that leads the speculator to bet against them. To explain
the phenomenon of speculation is to explain under what conditions we are likely to
observe belief-based trading.
We start oﬀ by analyzing the conditions to observe speculation. These will be
conditions on the market structure, and on the sources of belief heterogeneity. Sec-
tion 2 reviews Walrasian exchange economies, the standard model for competitive
environments, where it is established that a pre-condition for the existence of specu-
lation is that the market structure be incomplete. Section 3 discusses the conceptual
problems to explain belief heterogeneity on the basis of disparate information, and
extends the analysis to more general voluntary trade arrangements, stressing the bet-
ting component of speculation. Section 4 is devoted to the developments in the
heterogeneous prior paradigm. Section 5 concludes.
The primary focus of this survey, it must be emphasized, is on the microeconomic
theory of speculation. This means the discussion of the period preceding the de-
velopment of the economics of information, with macroeconomic orientation –where
the accent is placed on the issue of economic stability/instability– is left aside, as
well as the empirical work. We will only cite those results that are relevant to the
2more recent and formal discussion.
2 Walrasian exchange economies with
heterogeneous beliefs
Walrasian theory of markets emphasizes price taking and market taking: all market
participants (consumers and producers) regard prices and open markets as given, and
behave rationally with respect to those parameters (Makowski and Ostroy, 1995). It
is in this context that the present section addresses the problem of behavior under
heterogeneous beliefs. In order to focus on informational issues, only an exchange
economy is considered.
Debreu (1959) ﬁrst noticed that extending Walras’ model of competitive markets
to an intertemporal and uncertain environment could be done simply by reﬁning the
deﬁnition of commodity. Indeed, by treating a liter of milk today as a diﬀerent
object than a liter of milk tomorrow, and the liter of milk tomorrow if it happens
to rain as diﬀerently as if it does not –that is, by enlarging the commodity space–
one is able to analyze dynamic economies operating under uncertainty. There, he
makes the ﬁction of contingent claims being available as well as open markets for all
commodities just as in the certainty case. Thus, there is trading in L×T×Θ markets:
L goods, T dates and Θ states. In this view, the demand for assets originates on the
desire to move consumption across dates and states, that is, (ﬁnancial) assets are
3useful because they allow consumption smoothing to risk-averse individuals.
2.1 The basic framework:
the two-period complete-market model
In this section we brieﬂy review the standard theory. Let i ∈ I denote individuals,
` ∈ L (perishable) consumption goods, t ∈ {0,1} time periods, θ ∈ Θ states of nature
or complete descriptions of the world in t =1 , Θ0 ≡ Θ ∪ {0}, πi prior beliefs over
Θ, wi
t ∈ RL(Θ+1) endowments, ui(ci
θ) ∈ C2 utility functions over consequences, k ∈ K
assets, and qk the price of an asset k.
Debreu (1959) considers the case where there is complete agreement with regard
to the possible events (but not necessarily with respect to their likelihood) and where
all information is public. Hence, individuals choose the consumption vector xi of L
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4A striking fact is that this problem does not formally diﬀer at all from the standard
problem in consumer theory under certainty. This formulation stresses the fact that
t h ec o n s u m e ri sc h o o s i n gd i ﬀerent bundles of consumption goods by buying a special
kind of ﬁnancial asset called “contingent claim”.
The equilibrium is characterized by:
Deﬁnition 1 A Walrasian equilibrium for the exchange economy E = {(wi,Ui)i∈I},
is a vector (b p,x) such that:









θ` ∀θ ∈ Θ0,`∈ L
Theorem 1 In this economy, the resulting allocation is Pareto-optimal ex-ante and
ex-post irrespective of beliefs.
This proposition, the ﬁrst theorem of welfare economics, establishes that all gains
from trade are exploited in one round of trade. Moreover, if markets were to reopen
after the true state is known, no trade would occur since the allocation would still
be Pareto-optimal (that is, also Pareto-optimal in an ex-post sense). To see this,
one only needs to verify that the gradient vector of every individual’s utility function
is proportional to each other, both ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante, we have that
∇Ui(xi) ∝ ∇Uj(xj) because there is a market open for each argument of the utility




















Ex-post, when uncertainty is resolved, the gradient vectors are going to be modi-





πθ if θ occurred
0 otherwise
by Bayes’ rule. If we only consider
the part of the vector xi that contains consumption of goods in the state that actually
materialized, xi

























































Therefore, the opportunity of trading after uncertainty is resolved cannot improve
welfare, and the re-opening of the market will not induce consumers to trade.
What this implies, though, is that –in this economy– forecasting future as-
set prices is not an issue as there will not be open markets in the future, and –
subsequently– there can be no speculation.
In eﬀect, any diﬀerences in belief with respect to the likelihood of any particular
state happening creates at time 0 a trade of contingent claims directly, that will pay
consumption goods if the state materializes, so that reversing the position will not be
necessary.
Arrow (1963) considers an otherwise similar economy, except that the securities
that can be traded are not contingent claims but “pure securities” (also known as
6“Arrow securities”), that is, claims to 1 unit of account in state θ. There is trading
in Θ state-claims before the resolution of uncertainty, and in L goods after it. This
structure requires consumers to forecast consumption good prices pθ for each state.
However, since the only uncertainty refers to the state that will materialize (endow-
ments), it seems natural to assume that everyone agrees as to what prices will prevail































where b qθ is the price today of a pure asset that pays oﬀ in state θ and b ai
θ is the net




θwθ + b aθ if there is local non-satiation. Then, we have that (5)

























which is equivalent to the contingent claim case when b ps` = b qsps`. This means
that the two economies are equivalent, in the sense that the consumption sets that
t h e s em a r k e t sg i v er i s et oa r et h es a m e 2 . It follows that there is no special role for
1In Radner’s (1972) terminology, expectations are “common”. We come back to this issue in
section 2.2 below.
2Provided that we compare the same equilibrium, that is, we consider prices wich satisfy the
above equality.
7speculation either. Diﬀerences in beliefs as to the likelihood of a particular state
happening explain trade, but there is no opportunity of capital gains because there
are no price changes.
Finally, if instead of pure securities there were markets for ordinary securities,
that is, promises of payment of variable numbers of units of account contingent on
the occurrence of particular states, or put another way, bundles of pure securities,
matters would not be diﬀerent as long as we still have complete markets. In eﬀect, if
R is the Θ×K matrix that contains as columns the state-contingent payoﬀso ft h eK
assets in the Θ states, and if R is of full rank (the complete-markets condition) then
R−1 is the matrix specifying the portfolios of ordinary assets required to replicate
a pure security for each state. Therefore, the consumer has the same options as
before3.
One should emphasize, however, that although there can be no speculation in this
setting, asset markets do oﬀer the opportunity of gambling, in the sense that people
bet on the occurrence of particular states every time they choose to “put” a larger
consumption bundle or larger units of account on them. Diﬀerences of opinion πi
give rise to trade, even if there were no other motives. Likewise, asset prices are
aﬀected by beliefs and their dispersion.
3This implicitly assumes the possibility of unlimited short sales, for no restrictions are put on
the sign of the entries in R−1.
82.2 More time periods
The extension of the previous framework to more periods requires a reinterpretation
of the concept of state and the modeling of uncertainty. One approach is to continue
thinking of a state as a complete history of exogenous events, that is, a list of all
exogenous events that have taken place on each period. Events, then, become the
partial development of history through time. Many relevant aspects of reality are
excluded from the description of a state, though, and have to be included otherwise.
For instance, one such important feature of the world which is excluded from the
description of uncertainty is the future level of asset prices, because they depend on
future endogenous behavior.
Another approach is to think of a state as a description of every aspect of real-
ity that matters to each decision maker, including both, exogenous and endogenous
events. This will have to include other people’s behavior and the decision maker’s own
thought. The problem with this view is that the deﬁnition of the state becomes circu-
lar. Radner (1972) modeled uncertainty based on an intermediate position, namely,
assuming that states are exogenous but assuming common expectations (that is, all
traders associate the same prices to the same events.) Dutta and Morris (1997) have
highlighted the fact that this entails both, complete agreement and degenerate beliefs
with respect to the connection between (exogenous) events and prices. In this sense,
it constitutes a partial abandonment of the hypothesis of subjective beliefs and, on
the other hand, negates endogenous uncertainty —that is, uncertainty from the mar-
9ket process itself— for all unknowns are associated to the external events. Arrow
and Hahn (1999) have also pointed to this as one of modeling choices that call for a
revision. This line of research remains relatively unexplored yet.
It is possible that some events do not aﬀect payoﬀs directly but may still aﬀect
beliefs (for instance, some moves from nature like sunspots). We will call them
“pure informational events” to distinguish them from the “real events” which we
have considered so far. Then, let us think of a state ω ∈ Ω as being composed of two
parts, ω =( θ,η),w h e r eθ is a speciﬁcation of the history of payoﬀ-relevant actions
whereas η is of payoﬀ-irrelevant actions.
In what follows, it will be useful to recall a few deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2 As e tH is called a partition of another set Ω iﬀ ∪Hh = Ω and
h ∩ h0 = φ ∀h,h0 ∈ H.
L e tu sd e n o t eb yh(ω) the element of H that contains ω.
Deﬁnition 3 Let H and H∗ be two partitions of Ω. H is said to be ﬁner than H∗
(denoted by H b H∗)i fh(ω) ⊆ h∗(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
If H is ﬁner than H∗,t h e nH∗ is said to be coarser than H.
Notice that the relation b induces a partial order on the set of partitions of Ω,
and therefore the supremum and inﬁmum are meaningful.
Deﬁnition 4 For any pair of partitions, their join is H ∨ H0 =s u p {H,H0} and
their meet is H ∧ H0 =i n f{H,H0}.
10Thus, the join is the coarsest common reﬁnement, and the meet the ﬁnest common
coarsening. Events, then, are the elements of partitions ht(ω) ∈ Ht, which has the
interpretation that each agent knows at time t that the true state is one of the elements
of ht(ω), among which he cannot recognize the true one –remaining uncertainty–
and that he also can safely discard any ω0 / ∈ ht(ω). The set of events will form a tree4
represented by a sequence of partitions of Ω, {Ht}T
t=0,w h e r eHt is ﬁner than Ht−1






Figure 1: The event tree.
Figure 1 illustrates a situation where there are ﬁve states, each being a spec-
iﬁcation of, say, the actions of two persons at t =0and the choice of nature at
t =1 . The states are given by Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4,ω5},a n dt h et r e ec a nb e
4A tree is a set of nodes such that each node has a unique predecessor. This is necessary to
get a unique association between a state and a history, for if a terminal node had more than one
backward path, the knowledge of the terminal node would not suﬃce to uniquely pin down what
actually happened.
11represented by the partition sequence {{ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4,ω5}, {{ω1,ω2,ω3},{ω4,ω5}},
{{ω1},{ω2},{ω3},{ω4},{ω5}}}.
Contingent claims are now related to events and not to states, and the same holds
f o rc o n t i n g e n tp a y m e n t so fa s s e t s ,e i t h e rp u r eo ro r d i n a r y .
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Once these modiﬁcations are properly accounted for, everything remains the same,
namely, the complete-market economy is Pareto eﬃcient and there is no scope for
speculation unless the completeness is achieved by retrading of long-lived assets.
2.3 Incomplete markets
Radner (1972) also presents what is nowadays the standard framework to analyze
incomplete-market symmetric-information economies, that is, cases where “at every
date and for every commodity there will be some future dates and some events at
those dates for which it will not be possible to make current contracts for future
delivery contingent on those events”. In this setting, there is a nontrivial role for
sequential trading because the opportunity of retrading the same assets is valuable
as it enlarges the budget set. Hence, retrading acts as a substitute for inexistent
12markets5.
Hirshleifer (1975) exempliﬁes this idea. His model corresponds to a two-good
economy in which there are two rounds of trade, before and after the arrival of (pri-
vate6) information, and consumption occurs at the last date. However, markets are
incomplete since there are contingent claims for only one good; the second good must
be traded incontingently. In the anticipation of a price change, individuals would
trade to move from their endowment to a trading position, while they would trade
again to go to the consumption position once the uncertainty is resolved. The incom-
pleteness creates the need for trading in the second round, for as we have seen, under
a complete market regime consumers could choose directly the ﬁnal consumption
bundle of contingent commodities, and any diﬀerences in beliefs would be reﬂected
on date-zero prices. In fact, as pointed out in Hirshleifer (1977), “in the prior round
each trader would be able to buy a portfolio covering his desired consumption baskets
in the light of the alternative possible information-events as well as over the diﬀerent
state-contingencies”.
Thus, the intuitive conclusion that speculation occurs owing to diﬀering anticipa-
tions of price changes (and cannot be a consequence of a redistribution of risks) holds
5This idea is further developed in Duﬃe and Huang (1985).
6Although the text considers the possibility that the information received by each trader is
diﬀerent, the model makes no special treatment of it. Moreover, since priors diﬀer, posteriors would
diﬀer too, even though the information received be the same.
13because price changes are a necessary condition for completing the market via con-
tingent trading, i.e., to substitute for missing markets. Rubinstein (1975) expands
on this idea by considering a three-date Arrow-Debreu economy, where a complete
set of real-event contingent claims is available at every date but no information-event
contingent claim and there is only one consumption good. In this setting, Pareto-
optimallity obtains because retrading again substitutes for market-completeness.
Grundy and McNichols (1990) show that if it is known in advance that the market
will be open in the future, it is not clear at all that agents would prefer ap r i o r ito
t r a d ei na n yo ft h ea v a i l a b l er o u n d si np a r t i c u l a r . I no t h e rw o r d s ,i ft h em a r k e ti s
known to reopen, it might be very active in the second date, but it is only so because
it is necessary to complete transactions that could have been done in the ﬁrst round
but just weren’t. Therefore, giving a nontrivial role to future rounds of trade requires
the incompleteness of the set of available markets.
Up to this point, we have seen that existing asset markets allow individuals to
smooth consumption and/or gamble. Speculation –trading and retrading based on
belief heterogeneity– arises only if the market structure is incomplete, and has to
be seen as the natural consequence of the need to substitute for missing markets.
The next section describes how these conclusions change when belief heterogeneity is
explained solely by the existence of private information.
143 Information-based trading
So far we have assumed belief heterogeneity without paying special attention to the
sources of that heterogeneity. Indeed, the Walrasian tradition has been to treat
beliefs as exogenous variables, just like utility functions. Each person then makes
decisions based on observed prices without worrying about the origin of those prices
because the information concerning why a relative price took a particular value –
whether it can be traced back to beliefs, preferences, technology, etc.– is completely
useless. An implicit assumption, then, is that information is symmetric, that is, the
event tree {Ht}T
t=1 is shared by everyone.
Yet, common wisdom points to diﬀerences in information as the main source
of belief heterogeneity7. Speculators, in possession of more or better information,
would be better-than-average forecasters earning a return for their social contribution
in keeping prices in line with available information, which improves the quality of
investments. This is in broad terms the view of Working (1953), and also what Fama
(1970) had in mind when discussing the eﬃcient market hypothesis.
One way to model information heterogeneity is to imagine that at every moment all
information partitions diﬀer, that is, everybody is informed of a diﬀerent event. The
informational structure is then deﬁned as a state space Ω together with a collection
7Moreover, the “Harsanyi doctrine” holds that diﬀerences in information should be the only
source of belief heterogeneity. See section 4.
15of partitions of Ω, {Hi
t}
i=1,...I




What follows is a static analysis, so the time subscript is dropped.
Lintner (1969) presents what is possibly the ﬁrst attempt to explicitly incorporate
information as the source of belief heterogeneity. Using a general equilibrium model
in which risk averse investors with exponential preferences, endowed with private
signals {hi}I
i=1, have to make a portfolio decision between a risk-free and a risky asset
whose return is normally distributed –the “normal-exponential model”, which later
became standard in the ﬁnance literature–, he shows that the equilibrium asset price
depends on the vector of private signals. In particular, for an exogenous supply of
















where r is the rate of return on the risky asset, and r its ex-ante expected value.
This model seemed to conﬁrm the long-held intuitions that asset prices aggregate
information because demands are aﬀected by the signals received, and hence asset
prices are driven by information.
This model was criticized by the then novel theory of rational expectations, which
asserts that if agents are rational, they should recognize that the way prices are
formed makes them useful pieces of information in their own right. Grossman (1976),
for instance, shows that in Lintner’s model, the asset price is a suﬃcient statistic
for all private signals, and hence provides a better guide to decision-making than
16each particular piece of information taken by itself. Thus, Grossman is able to
show that private information is redundant once the price is known. This raises a
logical drawback in Lintner’s argument (namely, if every investor prefers to use the
information contained in the price and discards his own signal, how can the price
reﬂect that private information?), and casts doubts on his conclusions.
3.1 Rational expectations
The discussion that followed Grossman’s article tried to see the generality of the
argument and attempted to solve the paradox. The rational expectations approach
was to assume that investors understand the way prices are formed, and that they
consequently should use the information contained in those prices to revise their
beliefs. Radner (1979) formalizes this idea in the following way. Let q(ω) be the
price that would obtain in state ω. Construct the partition P of Ω in which each cell
is given by all states compatible with that price: P(ω)={ω0 ∈ Ω : q(ω)=q(ω0)}.
Then, the information agent i has is Hi ∨ P and not just Hi.N o t i c e t h a t Hi ∨ P is
ﬁner than Hi. We follow Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1987) in deﬁning:
Deﬁnition 5 A rational expectations equilibrium for the exchange economy E =
{Ω,(wi,Ui,Hi)i∈I} is a pair (p,x) such that:
1. xi ∈ {argmaxUi(xi) subject to p(ω)
0 xi(ω) ≤ p(ω)0wi(ω)} ∀i ∈ I









θ` ∀θ ∈ Θ0,`∈ L
Radner (1979) proves that generically P is ﬁner than ∨i∈IHi, that is, prices are
fully revealing8 (moreover, they can even convey information that nobody has!). This
is to say, it was proven that Grossman’s problem was indeed generic, and the paradox
well alive.
With regard to speculation this result is very strong: information-based trading
is completely ruled out because nobody can have better information than what is
embedded in the price. The next subsection generalizes this impossibility to more
general trading environments, showing that is not exclusive of rational expectations
models.
3.2 Common knowledge and speculation
As we have seen, in the rational expectations approach the problem of keeping private
information actually private arises from both, the inﬂuence of every trader on the
price (no price-taking in an informational sense) and the knowledge every trader has
of the price function. We will see that it is not the Walrasian bargaining feature of
the model which drives the result, but the knowledge of others —their understanding
8There is an issue of cardinality though. The price function can be generically one-to-one with
the set of states only if the set of states is not rich enough, otherwise partial revelation is obtained
(Allen (1981)).
18of the situation they are involved in—. We will ﬁrst introduce the basic tools to
model knowledge, then generalize the trading environment and conclude this section
by showing that the previous result still holds.
If the information structure (that is, the collection of partitions of Ω, {Hi}i∈I,
representing the possible signals every player may receive) is commonly known9,t h e n
knowledge of hi
t(ω) also implies knowledge of what other agents may know, for indi-
vidual i cannot reject the possibility that individual j knows hj(ω0) for any ω0 ∈ hi(ω).
Mutual knowledge is, then, implied this way by the state and the informational struc-
ture.
Deﬁne the knowledge operator as
Ki(E)={ω ∈ Ω : h
i(ω) ⊆ E} (9)
which has the interpretation that player i knows that event E occurred if E cannot
be ruled out in any of the states he considers as possible. Similarly, when individual
i at ω cannot reject any of the states in which j knows E,t h e ni knows that j knows
E:
ω ∈ Ki (Kj(E)) (10)
Lengthier iterations of the knowledge operator reﬂect higher levels of mutual knowl-
9Aumann suggests this is indeed tautological, for part of the deﬁnition of the state is what each
agent knows abouth the knowledge of others. Geanakoplos (1994) and Arrow and Hahn (1999)
discuss this issue.
19edge.
Deﬁnition 6 (Aumann, 1976) An event E is common knowledge if ∧i∈Ihi(ω) ≡
M(ω) ⊆ E.
Clearly, if hi(ω) ⊆ E then agent i considers E to be true in every state he sees
as possible. This is also true for every i ∈ I,s i n c ehi(ω) ⊆ M(ω).M o r e o v e r , a l l
iterations of the form Kk (Kj(...Ki(ω))) are also true, so mutual knowledge is true
even in inﬁnite regressions. Common knowledge is, in a sense, the least knowledge
one can attribute to anybody. On the other hand, the maximum knowledge in society
is represented by the join of {Hi}i∈I.
We now represent trades as bets. Ultimately, when an income stream is chosen
over another, one could say that there is an implicit bet over the likelihood of the
states where income is increased. In fact, buying a share in the hope of a price rise
is to bet on a price increase. More precisely,
Deﬁnition 7 Ab e ti saf u n c t i o nb : Θ −→ RI specifying for each state θ av e c t o ro f
monetary payoﬀs bθ =( b1
θ,...,bI




θ =0.P l a y e r i is said
to have bet $b on state θ if, whenever some state θ
0 ∈ ΘÂ{θ} occurs, bi
θ0 = −b.
Thus, a bet is a vector of transfers that must be agreed upon by all participants.
For instance, in the Arrow-Debreu model, it is possible to deﬁne the indirect utility





























It is important to keep in mind, though, that implicit on it there are beliefs,
and there is knowledge that provides a basis for them. The function vi(bi), then,
evaluates income streams on the basis of preferences, beliefs, and endowments. In
particular, vi(bi) can evaluate bets.
Ab e tb =( b






i) ∀i ∈ I (12)
O n em i g h tw i s ht os e p a r a t eo u tt h ep a r to fat r a d ei sd u et od i ﬀerences in beliefs
from the part due to consumption smoothing. Let e b be the bet that would be
carried over if all beliefs would coincide and agree to implicit state prices, that is,
πi = e π ∀i ∈ I. Such a state-contingent transfer would of course be justiﬁed by the
structure of endowments and risk aversion. Then, b b≡(b−e b) would be due entirely
to diﬀerences in beliefs. Speculation, in this sense, would be the act of betting on
some states based on deviant expectations. For if beliefs would coincide, then there
would be no speculation at all.
It can readily be seen that this is exactly what is done in a Walrasian economy
where Arrow—securities are traded. Security markets give the opportunity of betting
21in the above sense, because of diﬀerences in beliefs, endowments, or risk aversion.
The only special feature of Walrasian economies is the way in which the available













the fact that q satisﬁes market-clearing10.
The present analysis, then, has the advan t a g et h a ti ti n c l u d e s— b u ti sn o tl i m i t e d
to— Walrasian economies, for it can serve as a characterization of any voluntary process
of trade.
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) prove the following theorem11:
Theorem 2 Suppose all traders are risk-averse, that the initial allocation is Pareto-
optimal, that agents’ prior beliefs are common, and that each player i observes the
information conveyed by the partition Hi. I fi ti sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g ea tω that b
is a feasible trade and that each trader weakly prefers it to the zero trade, then every
agent is indiﬀerent between b and the zero trade. If all agents are strictly risk averse
then b is the zero trade.
Thus, Geanakoplos (1994), in an ﬁne survey on common knowledge, asserts that
“The main conclusion is that an apparently innocuous assumption of common knowl-
10This is a bet if one considers bi
θ + bi






































=0since k is a ﬁnancial asset and because of market clearing.
11Aside from notational diﬀerences, their theorem was stated with a softer assumption, namely,
concordant beliefs rather than common priors. See Morris (1994).
22edge rules out speculation, betting, and agreeing to disagree”. Speciﬁcally, he
provides a proof of the following:
Theorem 3 Let (Ω,(Hi,A i,s i)i∈I) be given, where Ω is a set of states of the world,
Hi is a partition on Ω, Ai is an action set, and the strategy si : Ω −→ Ai speciﬁes
the action agent i takes at each ω ∈ Ω,f o ra l li ∈ I.S u p p o s e t h a t si is generated
by the decision rule ψi :2 Ω −→ Ai satisfying the sure-thing principle12.( T h u s
si(ω)=ψi(hi(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω,i∈ I.)I f f o r e a c h i it is common knowledge at ω
that si takes on the value ai, then there is some single event E such that ψi(E)=ai
for every i ∈ I.
In the context of this survey, the ψi function corresponds to the strategy that
trader i follows (indicating what to do at every information set hi(ω) she may ﬁnd
herself in). The theorem, then, establishes that the same action proﬁle could have
been obtained with symmetric information in an otherwise similar game. Hence, the
informational asymmetry is not the explanation for the observed actions.
Special cases of the above theorem are Aumann’s agreeing to disagree result and
Milgrom and Stokey’s no-trade theorem. In fact, the following example is provided
by the latter to see the role of common knowledge in the no-trade theorem:
12A version of the sure-thing principle says that if ψ(A)=ψ(B)=a and A ∩ B = φ,t h e n
ψ(A ∪ B)=a. The fact that expected utility (according to Savage’s (1974) axiomatization)
satisﬁes the sure-thing principle is obviously not innocuos. The central point is really intertemporal
consistency.
23Example 1 (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) There are two payoﬀ-relevant states, Θ =
{θ1,θ2}. Two players must simultaneously decide whether they accept or reject a bet
in the following terms: if state θ1 materializes, player 2 (she) pays $1 to player 1 (he);
if θ2 occurs, the reverse payment is carried out. Before making a decision, however,
each of them gets to see a private signal (information event) within the following
sets: H1 = {{η1,η2},{η3,η4},{η5}} and H2 = {{η1},{η2,η3},{η4,η5}},w h i c hi n
fact are two distinct partitions of Λ = {η1,η2,η3,η4,η5}. They have common priors
on (Θ × Λ) given by
η1 η2 η3 η4 η5
θ1 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05
θ2 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.20
Suppose the true message is η3. Should they bet? The answer is no if there is
common knowledge of rationality. To see this, imagine ﬁrst that the players are
rational but they are not aware of their opponent’s rationality. Then, each player





















As both are positive, they would accept. Moreover, if each of them knew that his/her
opponent is rational too, they would not only check their own answer but also their
opponent’s answer, according to the information they could have received. Indeed,






















her acceptance does not tell him anything new and his original calculation is still the
most accurate. Similarly, she observes that his behavior would be the same irrespective





















However, the analysis would be diﬀerent with one more level of knowledge of mutual
rationality. Suppose that not only player 1 knows she is rational, but also that he
knows that she knows that he is rational. In that case, when receiving message {η3,η4}
he knows she could have received messages {η2,η3} or {η4,η5}, which in turn implies
she would consider cases where he receives messages {η1,η2},{η3,η4}, or {η5}.T h e n
s h ek n o w s ,h er e a s o n s ,t h a ti fh ea c c e p t ss h ec a ns a f e l ya s s u m et h em e s s a g ew a sn o t
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Similarly, as she would reject the bet when the message is {η1} and he knows it, he in
turn would not accept when receiving {η1,η2} as a message. But this leaves us with
the message η3 as the only candidate for simultaneous acceptance of the bet. As in







(−1) = 0 = E[u2|{η3}]
where their expectations have converged (negating asymmetric information) and there
are no gains from trade.
Remark 1 All this complicated reasoning is embedded in the deﬁnition of Nash equi-
librium. Once common priors on the possible states of the world are assumed, the
assumption of common knowledge is invoked when looking at a Nash equilibrium of
26this game. The above example, for instance, has the associated normal form:
s1 \ s2 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
000 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
001 0,0 -.15,.15 0,0 -.15,.15 0,0 -.15,.15 0,0 -.15,.15
010 0,0 .10,-.10 0,0 .10,-.10 0,0 .10,-.10 0,0 .10,-.10
011 0,0 -.05,.05 0,0 -.05,.05 0,0 -.05,.05 0,0 -.05,.05
100 0,0 0,0 -.10,.10 -.10,.10 .15,-.15 .15,-.15 .05,-.05 .05,-.05
101 0,0 -.15,.15 -.10,.10 -.25,.25 .15,-.15 0,0 .05,-.05 -.10,.10
110 0,0 .10,-.10 -.10,.10 0,0 .15,-.15 .25,-.25 .05,-.05 .15,-.15
111 0,0 -.05,.05 -.10,.10 -.15,.15 .15,-.15 .10,-.10 .10,-.10 0,0
where acceptance is represented by a 1 and rejection by a 0. The knowledge of the
opponent’s partition is implied by the knowledge of his/her strategy. This game has
four pure-strategy Nash equilibria (in bold), none of them corresponding to the com-
mon wisdom that an auspicious private message will induce betting (strategy proﬁle
s = (110,011) in the example). Following theorem 3, ψ1({η3,η4})=ψ2({η2,η3})=
ψ1({η3})=ψ2({η3})=0 .
The common prior and common knowledge assumptions, embedded on rational
expectations models, explain Tirole’s claim that “speculation relies on inconsistent
plans and is ruled out by rational expectations”. It turns out that speculation is
ruled out in many other trading environment satisfying these assumptions as well.
27This result is problematic for a theory of price formation under uncertainty. A
part of the ﬁnance literature chose to drop the assumption of common knowledge as
a mechanism to circumvent the problem. In fact, most of the private information lit-
erature was constructed initially over a modiﬁed version of the rational expectations
model, namely, the noisy rational expectations model. The modiﬁcation consists
of adding a random shock to the asset supply, often justiﬁed because of the impre-
dictability of trading behavior of some traders —henceforth noise traders—. This
amounts to exclude a fraction of the population from what is explainable to both,
the modeler and the rest of the agents in the model —thereby breaking down common
knowledge—.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), for instance, use the normal-exponential so mod-
iﬁed to show that private incentives to information-gathering activities are restored
because no individual can perfectly infer the signal vector just by looking at the price
—provided that there is enough noise, and that information is costly—. This class
of model was developed further and applied to analyze informational issues notably
by Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrechia (1981), Admati (1985), Kyle (1985), and
Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1986).
Although the noise trader approach proved useful for analyzing information ac-
quisition and aggregation under diﬀerent market structures, the exogenous behavior
of some agents on which it relies is not entirely satisfactory, for it raises the doubt
as to which feature is responsible for obtaining such an incomplete inference from
28the price. Behavioral irrationality? (that is, trading no matter what the price or
the information) Limited inference capabilities, or bounded rationality of some kind?
In other words, the source of noise trading is at least as obscure as the source of
the diﬀerences in beliefs that these models tried to illuminate. Another approach is
to drop the homogeneous prior assumption, that is, to consider private information
along with intrinsically diﬀerent views of the world as explanations for speculation.
4 Heterogeneous priors
With heterogeneous priors, even public information generates trade, for individuals
arrive to diﬀerent conclusions and “agree to disagree”13.I n e ﬀect, the arrival of
information h will make every rational player to updated her prior beliefs πi
θ according
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θ0 if θ ∈ h
0 otherwise
.
which will be diﬀerent across individuals in general, as πi
θ 6= πi0
θ, creating a gap among
marginal rates of substitution and hence gains from trade.
Although it does not immediately follow that private information will also gen-
erate trade in any environment, for information asymmetries open the possibility of
13Provided, of course, markets are incomplete. This scenario actually corresponds to the model
in section 2.
29misrepresentation —that is, revealing private information through behavior may not
be incentive compatible, as explained by Morris (1994)—, in general it will, at least in
competitive environments. The following are partial equilibrium examples of it.
Harrison and Kreps (1978) develop a model with a continuum of risk-neutral
investors that hold heterogeneous expectations over the dividend process a single se-
curity follows. In particular, they consider a continuum of individuals i ∈ [0,1],
each belonging to a limited number of types γ ∈ Γ. All individuals of a particular
t y p eh o l dt h es a m ep r i o rπ
γ
0 over the set of histories Ω, but priors diﬀer across types.
Information (including the current dividend) is public, so that expectations are driven
by the common event-tree {Ht}
T
t=0. That is, for a particular history ω, the sequence
Eγ [qt+1|ht(ω)] will in general be diﬀerent for each type. The model is simpliﬁed
by assuming that the wealth of each class is suﬃciently large (possibly inﬁnite) and
that short sales are not allowed, so that the asset will always be hold by individuals
of the highest time-t valuation type. Further, it assumes point expectations for the
price process as Radner did: associated to each state there is a unique price. Dis-
agreement about future asset prices is, then, uniquely characterized by disagreement
about states, and therefore accounted for by prior heterogeneity. As a result, at every
point in time, the equilibrium price must be (weakly) larger than what any particular
investor might think the worth is –the diﬀerence being a bubble–. The possibility
of reselling, together with intrinsically diﬀerent views of the world, increases the value
30of the asset over what any type will be willing to pay if obliged to hold it forever14.
Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) present models along
the same lines. The former considers a two-type economy with T periods and risk-
neutral investors, in which every period a public signal is observed. The signal will be
either high or low. In any case, both groups will disagree because of the diﬀerence in
their priors15. In turn, the latter constructs a three-period two-type economy, where
posterior beliefs are normally distributed —with diﬀerent means and variances across
types— and preferences are exponential. The restrictions imposed in both cases are
justiﬁed as simplifying assumptions adopted to make the model amendable to testing,
which is their main purpose.
The debate on whether heterogeneous priors is a sensible assumption or not does
n o ta p p e a rt ob ev e r yi m p o r t a n ti nﬁnance. The central issue being discussed is
whether diﬀerences in beliefs should be explained exclusively on the basis of infor-
mation —the Harsanyi doctrine— or not. From a logical perspective, the issue is not
clearly settled yet (see Morris (1995), Gul (1998) and Aumann (1998) for arguments
on both sides). However, for all practical purposes heterogeneous priors seems to be
a sensible assumption. Indeed, even the most prominent advocate of homogeneous
14This actually corresponds to their–and Keynes’–deﬁniniton of “speculation.”
15When they say they assume common priors in the paper, they refer to the marginal over payoﬀ-
relevant events θ and not to the actual prior over states ω. As the conjugate posteriors are diﬀerent
(what they call “diﬀerent models”), then their priors over Ω must diﬀer.
31priors, Robert Aumann, says in reference to information as the only source of belief
heterogeneity that “when we say all information, we mean all: the schools the players
attended, their childhood experiences, even their genes (which indirectly reﬂect the
experience of previous generations)” (Aumann, 1998).
It is very diﬃcult indeed to think of a problem in ﬁnance in which private informa-
tion has this broad meaning; on the contrary, informational issues refer usually to a
tiny part of all information. Consequently, priors with respect to the marginal infor-
mational diﬀerence will never be the same. And although it might still be true that
speculation cannot be the consequence of private information alone (in the sense of
the last piece of information received by itself), private information will never come
isolated from an individual’s whole history. Isolating it, then, lacks any practical
interest.
H a v i n gs a i dt h a t ,w eh a v et oq u a l i f yt h is argument by pointing out that there
is a fundamental diﬀerence between assuming heterogeneous priors from the outset
or assuming common priors together with diﬀerent personal histories: in one case
there is nothing to learn from other person’s beliefs, while in the other there is —the
history itself—. When seen this way, the argument in favor of heterogeneous priors
is a practical one: asymmetric information models of trade modeled as subgames of
whole trader’s histories are not likely to be tractable.
Heterogeneous prior models not only have gained support from a theoretical per-
spective, but also from an empirical one. The thirst for this sort of model comes
32from observations like Ross’ (1989), that “It is diﬃcult to imagine that the volume
of trade in security markets has very much to do with the modest amount of trading
required to accomplish the continual and gradual portfolio balancing inherent in our
current intertemporal models.” Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson
(1995) present examples of that. However, one objection to this line of research is
that prior beliefs are exogenous unobservable variables and as such it is very diﬃcult
to agree on a set of “acceptable degrees of heterogeneity.” How diﬀerent priors can
be? In principle, it would seem that too many degrees of freedom are open to the
researcher. But this is not really the case. For instance, if a decision-maker is
confronted repeatedly with the same situation, where a lot of data is available, prior
beliefs should be less heterogeneous as compared to situations that do not occur very
often.16
Another approach consists of forcing prior beliefs to be consistent with the data in
empirical applications. Kurz (1995)17, for instance, develops a dynamic model with
learning where individuals may hold any beliefs as long as they are not contradicted
by the data. In the model, belief heterogeneity is only limited by what individuals
16An argument of this sort can be found implicitly in Keynes’ (1937) discussion of long-term
vs. short-term expectations, or in the de-reﬁnement proposed by Fudenberg and Levine (1993)
“self-conﬁrming equilibrium.”
17Kurz’s model not only abandons the common prior but also the common expectations assump-
tions.
33observe. When taking the model to the data, beliefs are given a particular form.
Instead of calibrating the heterogeneity from the data in each application, one may
wish to restrict prior diversity from the outset, using for that purpose the accumu-
lated knowledge about human beliefs in other sciences. A behavioral approach would
be to construct a model whose features are consistent with a variety of regularities
accumulated in experiments or in the psychology literature. De Bondt and Thaler
(1994), for instance, argue in favor of constructing descriptive models from assump-
tions that are approximately true, such as overconﬁdence (that is, overestimating the
reliability of our own knowledge), or loss aversion and framing (the fact that people
are more aﬀected by losses than gains and would react diﬀerently if a given decision
problem is framed as loss avoidance than as a gains comparison).
One example of this approach is provided by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrah-
manyam (1998), who construct a model based on the idea of overconﬁdence. Again
we have two populations, one of risk-neutral informed overconﬁdent investors, and
the other of risk-averse uninformed investors. There are three dates; at the initial
date there is a portfolio decision, at the intermediate date informed investors observe
a private signal and may choose to rebalance their portfolio, and at the ﬁnal date
consumption takes place. Individuals are overconﬁdent in the sense that they as-
sociate to the signal a higher level of accuracy than it really has, with the eﬀect of
making them overreact.
It must be emphasized that prior heterogeneity is not a synonymous for irrational
34beliefs. Heterogeneous priors produce beliefs which are inconsistent across individuals
(and hence opens the opportunity of mutually beneﬁcial trade), but each belief may
very well be consistent with itself (i.e., that it be updated according to Bayes rule).
An overconﬁdent person in the previous paragraph is not an irrational one, but only
a badly informed person (about the quality of her own knowledge). Irrational beliefs,
however, will in general be inconsistent across individuals as well.
It is natural to ask whether the market will eliminate those “wrong beliefs” (ei-
ther uninformed or irrational), that is, if it will select better-informed (or rational)
investors, increasing their relative wealth. The answer to this question is not necessar-
ily aﬃrmative. For instance, De Long et al. (1991) show that a group of overconﬁdent
investors –that is, those who underestimate risks– may not only survive, but even
eventually dominate the market. Indeed, they will risk more; as long as the market
rewards risk-taking, its wealth may increase over the long run even up to the point
of dominating the group of investors whose beliefs are correct, and despite of the fact
that they are more likely to become ruined and that their overconﬁdence makes them
consume more. Kyle and Wang (1997) raise an additional source of supremacy in the
context of a duopoly game: overconﬁdent investors may outperform rational investors
because overconﬁdence may act like a commitment device. Benos (1998), in eﬀect,
shows that overconﬁdence causes aggressive trading. In summary, even though the
answer will in general depend on the environment, these examples show that it is not
at all clear that the argument of survival favors the homogenous priors assumption.
35Finally, not only rationality may constrain belief heterogeneity, but also market
completeness. Araujo and Sandroni (1999) show that when asset markets are com-
plete, the existence of equilibrium requires that agent’s posterior beliefs eventually
become homogeneous, for otherwise there would be certain events to which some in-
dividual associate negligible probability while others do not. This creates almost
arbitrage opportunities, which are ruled out by equilibrium.
5 Concluding remarks
Many diﬃculties arise when attempting to rationalize the notion of speculation —
understood as belief-based trading—. First, while diﬀerences in beliefs explain ex-
change, that trade will only constitute speculation if ﬁnancial asset markets are in-
complete (or at most essentially complete). If there were at every time a complete
set of contingent claims, there would be no need to buy assets with a view to resell
them at a later date.
Second, private information alone can not explain speculative behavior if individ-
uals interpret information in the same way (common priors). If private information
motivates trade, it is because there are (enough) other traders with diﬀerent motives
simultaneously participating in the market. Their presence is necessary to prevent
full revelation of private information and/or to provide rents to be appropriated by
speculators. Purely speculative markets can not exist.
36One alternative to avoid the no-trade theorem is to drop the common knowledge
assumption. The popular approach of noisy rational expectations models did it by
restricting common knowledge to a subpopulation, whereas the rest of the population,
that is, noise traders, behaved in an unpredictable (and impossible to understand)
way. The shortcut is useful for many purposes, but the conclusions are unlikely
to be robust as explanations for speculation. Even though the common knowledge
assumption might be too strong, the problem is that there is no obvious way of
relaxing it, and consequently attempts in this direction are likely to be rendered as
ad hoc. For this reason, any progress in this line should come from the interactive
epistemology literature.
Finally, if individuals interpret information diﬀerently (heterogeneous priors), then
even public information can motivate trade —provided that markets are incomplete—.
In this view, ﬁnancial markets not only process information, but also select “models.”
M o r e o v e r ,t h i ss e l e c t i o nm i g h tb ep e r m a n e n t ,a si ti sn o to b v i o u sap r i o r it h a tt h e
“wrong” models will be driven out of the market by the “correct” ones.
From an empirical standpoint, heterogeneous prior models appear to explain in
a parsimonious way many of the regularities found in the data; regularities that,
at the same time, are diﬃcult to reconcile with the homogeneous prior assumption.
However, in order for this approach to gain wider acceptance, it is necessary that some
consensus is achieved with regard to the kind of heterogeneity that is acceptable in
a model. We have seen some steps in this direction, with arguments arising from
37evolutionary game theory and psychology (behavioral economics). We expect to see
many contributions from these areas in the near future.
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